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A Reply 
Lee Epstein† 
Gary King††  
Receiving three detailed responses in this exchange is gratifying 
and confirms our view of the importance of including articles devoted 
primarily to methodology and research design in law reviews. Our 
primary goals in writing The Rules of Inference
1 were to adapt the 
rules to research in legal scholarship, to explicate and elucidate them, 
and to argue that they should be followed in all future empirical stud-
ies. We are pleased, despite the fireworks in these reviews (about 
which we say more below) that all six of our distinguished commenta-
tors appear to stand unanimously with us in support of these key 
claims. Indeed, none of the reviewers question a single rule we offered 
or any general methodological advice we gave, and all agreed that fol-
lowing the rules we proposed will help researchers in this field to 
learn about the world. We are also encouraged that the reviewers ap-
pear to believe that our suggestions for improving the organization of 
legal scholarship’s support for empirical work at least “warrant debate 
and discussion.”
2 These were precisely the goals we set out to achieve. 
We hope the legal community will join together with us and our dis-
cussants to continue to foster the development of a new subfield de-
voted to the methodology of empirical research in the law, to further 
adapt and extend the rules of inference in this area of scholarship, and 
to continue to integrate this aspect of legal scholarship into the rest of 
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the academy for the purpose of advancing our knowledge of the em-
pirical world. 
I.  PERSUASION VERSUS INFERENCE 
Legal scholars are conducting more and more empirical research, 
but as is evident from the reviews, inference is hardly the only purpose 
of legal scholarship. We thought this point was sufficiently obvious and 
well accepted (and in any event it was not the point of our Article) 
that we did not emphasize it. In retrospect, however, doing so might 
have made the reviewers feel less defensive. For example, Professors 
Goldsmith and Vermeule seem to accept our characterization of the 
purposes of legal scholarship, but tax us for putting it in a “buried 
footnote.”
3 We have no objection to a change of emphasis, and so in 
this response, we begin with this footnote. In our Article, we raised 
some of the obvious training differences between law professors and 
social scientists and then wrote: 
These training differences have led to numerous misunderstand-
ings and accusations being lobbed back and forth across the dis-
ciplinary divide. What critics miss, however, is that these differ-
ences in perspective are consistent with the markedly differing 
goals of the two sides. Among other things, [social and natural] 
scientists aim to conduct good empirical research, to learn about 
the world, and to make inferences. Lawyers and judges, and 
hence law professors, in contrast, specialize in persuasion. Law-
yers need to persuade judges and juries to favor their clients, and 
the rules of persuasion in the adversary system are different from 
the rules of empirical inquiry. As actors who lack the power of 
enforcement, judges attempt to enhance the legitimacy of their 
actions by persuading the parties to lawsuits, the executive 
branch, the public, and so on, that judicial decisions have a firm 
basis in the established prior authority of law rather than in the 
personal discretion of judges—even when that authority is incon-
sistent, illogical, historically inaccurate, or nonexistent. Law re-
views, in turn, are filled in part with shadow court opinions (with 
many articles written by former law clerks), rearguing, support-
ing, or practicing this art of political persuasion. For the purposes 
of political persuasion, “judges can make claims about history, 
philosophy, economics, and political science that would be re-
garded as shallow or discreditable by practitioners of those disci-
plines but that do not offend the minimal standards of acceptabil-
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ity for performance of their own distinctive craft.”
4 We can see 
the lack of contradiction only by recognizing that the Ph.D.s’ goal 
of learning about the empirical world differs from the J.D.s’ goal 
of political persuasion. Of course, lawyers also understand that 
ideas about the world can be wrong, and Ph.D.s use persuasion to 
convince others of the importance of their ideas, but the institu-
tional differences in the fields nevertheless remain stark.
5 
The overlap in the goals of the two sides briefly outlined in this 
footnote is substantial. Indeed, the purpose of this response is to per-
suade readers that following the rules of inference will help them 
learn about the empirical world. The veracity of our point has been 
demonstrated innumerable times in different disciplines, and so in 
some sense we think we are “right,” but our goals of persuading read-
ers to listen to our points about these rules and to act on that basis is 
no less an act of persuasion than a law professor trying to convince 
readers that his or her ideological position is normatively preferable. 
Yet, there is a crucial difference. To see this, compare the extreme 
case of pure normative philosophy with most of the sciences. Much 
progress has been made in philosophy at posing interesting questions 
and working out illuminating ways of thinking about them, but in 
twenty-five hundred years there has been relatively little discernible 
progress at achieving consensus on the “right” normative positions 
(whatever that might mean). The sciences have done no better at de-
ciding the “right” empirical questions to ask, but they have made 
stunning progress at learning about the world and often even at engi-
neering it to serve human purposes, at least for some questions. This 
difference is neither a surprise nor a criticism of the venerable field of 
philosophy. We obviously need both scholarly endeavors, and it would 
make no sense to ask which is “better.”  
However, the massive difference in results does suggest that if 
some part of a research program can be posed as an empirical ques-
tion then it seems worthwhile to do so—not to suppress the philoso-
phical question (which would be unproductive), nor to turn a norma-
tive question into an empirical one (which is usually impossible)—but 
to take advantage of the well-developed rules of inference and the 
methods of the natural and social sciences to make progress where 
progress is possible. No amount of empirical research will convince 
everyone that capital punishment is or is not morally justifiable, but 
empirical research should eventually be able to tell us whether it has a 
deterrent effect on crime. The empirical fact could be useful for help-
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ing to make public policy, for learning about the world for its own 
sake, or for helping to inform the normative debate. One key point to 
take from all this is that progress in learning about the world in spe-
cific, perhaps narrow, areas will be delayed unless we are able to iden-
tify empirical questions so that we may follow the standard proce-
dures of science. 
Similarly, although almost every predominantly empirical article 
engages in some persuasion and nearly every article aiming to per-
suade readers of an ideological position uses some empirical evidence, 
most scholars recognize the advantages of keeping the two goals at 
least conceptually distinct (outside of some extreme nihilistic, relativ-
istic, or postmodern schools of thought). We therefore feel comfort-
able with our claim that the vast majority of articles in law reviews 
make at least some empirical claims, even if that is not the main pur-
pose of their work. The same key point applies here too: legal scholars 
will be hindered in making progress in learning about the world unless 
they are able to identify their empirical questions and distinguish 
them from their efforts at persuasion. Such a move does not imply 
that science is value-free, that normative concerns are unimportant, or 
that persuasive rhetoric can ever be fully separated from empirical re-
search. It only means that some progress can be made if we keep our 
empirical focus, at least temporarily. 
Goldsmith and Vermeule respond to this notion when they write: 
Epstein and King’s complaint [about current practices in legal 
scholarship] elides a critical possibility: the contest of “particular 
versions” of the truth ventilated by legal articles that are tenden-
tious when taken separately may, at the systematic level, produce 
increasingly accurate approximations of truth, as scholar-
advocates criticize the work of opposing camps. That possibility 
transposes the standard justification for the adversary system 
from the courtroom to the faculty common room, collapsing one 
of the loadbearing walls in [Epstein and King’s] construct.
6  
Goldsmith and Vermeule are correct in one narrow sense: that 
“adversary scholarship” might work is indeed a “possibility.” However, 
we have no examples of academic disciplines making sustained pro-
gress in learning about the world with such an approach. At best, the 
hypothesis must come with considerably more uncertainty than is re-
flected in Goldsmith and Vermeule’s conclusion. 
Thus, if learning about the world remains a goal of empirical re-
search in the law—in addition to the goals of argumentation and per-
suasion—the legal community has a choice. It may either encourage 
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scholars to assume the veracity of Goldsmith and Vermeule’s untested 
hypothesis, where we mislead each other in pursuit of personal fame 
and fortune and hope that the collective result will benefit everyone, 
or we can encourage practices in this one area of the field (that is, 
when, and perhaps only when, scholars are doing empirical research 
for the purposes of learning about the world) to follow the norms in 
the dozens of academic disciplines that have decades of experience 
making progress in learning about the world. The evidence is strongly 
in favor of encouraging legal scholars who wish to contribute to soci-
ety’s collective knowledge about the world to work as these other 
fields do—in competition and cooperation with, at its best, norms of 
honesty, openness, free exchange of scholarly information, neutral re-
porting of empirical results, disincentives to mislead and distort the 
facts for one’s personal gain, etc.
7 Even if the adversary system is op-
timal for the courtroom, there exists no serious basis for thinking it 
would work better in academia than the system—indeed the only sys-
tem—that has worked so well for learning about the world in so many 
other disciplines. 
Goldsmith and Vermeule defend current practices by explaining 
that “legal scholars often write in the lawyer’s style rather than in the 
empiricist’s because they are participants in, not just students of, the 
legal system’s practices.”
8 When scholars are participants in the legal 
system’s practices, even when they are writing in law reviews for this 
purpose, we have little reason to object as long as they clearly state 
these purposes. But we need to recognize that the change in legal 
scholarship toward doing serious empirical research for learning 
about the world demands a concomitant change in attitude and norms 
for at least this new area. Would you frequent a physician who is “ten-
dentious” in his recommendation for medical treatment, who recom-
mends medicines for you to take based on whether he makes a finan-
cial profit or improves his academic reputation? Of course not. Well, 
then why should society, the legal community, or the rest of the acad-
emy pay attention to law professors who draw conclusions about the 
empirical world based on biased, advocacy-style “tendentious” schol-
arship? The legal profession has gained the new power of empirical 
research. It should not be controversial, when offering empirical 
analyses as the basis for drawing conclusions about the world, to sug-
gest that legal scholars follow the physicians: First of all, do no harm. 
                                                                                                                           
7  Many scholars in these other fields do not live up to these utopian ideals, but at least the 
ideals are widely accepted and the institutions in these fields are set up to reward scholars for 
adhering to them. And in any event the only question at issue presently is whether we should en-
courage people to follow these norms or to give up and say “anything goes.” 
8  Goldsmith and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 155 (cited in note 3). 196  The University of Chicago Law Review [69:191 
Which brings us to our discussants. In addition to agreeing with 
the central points of our Article, these scholars are indeed also “play-
ing a different game.”
9 They are engaging in persuasion, and, to be 
clear, they are exceptionally good at what they do: on first reading 
even we found their rhetoric persuasive and thought we had made a 
list of embarrassing mistakes. But upon rereading, carefully parsing 
what they wrote, and sometimes checking the sources they gave, we 
came to realize that the cases they made were persuasive only when 
we were not paying close attention. But, as Goldsmith and Vermeule 
explained in the quote we gave above, the norms of disinterested 
scholarship, impartial analysis, and the absence of intentionally mis-
leading arguments are clearly missing from these reviews. It is not as 
hard as it should be to find similar displays in the social sciences, but 
we know of no exchange like this that is also accompanied by rhetoric 
(such as the quote from Goldsmith and Vermeule above) that openly 
seeks to justify deception in scholarly discourse. 
To take one example of the tactics used in this exchange, we used 
an article by Professor Revesz to explain what it takes to make an 
empirical analysis replicable. With the information he provided in his 
article, we explained, no one else would be able to reproduce his re-
sults. The article contained much interesting analysis, but we found 
that this one critical feature was missing. We were then obviously sur-
prised to read his Response, which indicates to the contrary: 
In fact, any researcher seeking to replicate my study would not 
have any such problem. My published work contains references 
to both the coding protocol used for my study and to the notes 
explaining the manner in which cases were coded, and indicates 
that these documents are both publicly available from the journal 
that published my article.
10  
On reading this passage, we thought we had made a serious error. 
So we went back to his article and looked for all this information that 
we had apparently missed. We found nothing: the information is not in 
his article. It took a good deal more effort on our part to discover that 
Revesz did not lie in his Response to our piece. The only way to know, 
however, is to parse his words exceptionally carefully and track every 
footnote down to its original source: when Revesz refers to “my arti-
cle,” it turns out he is not referring to the article we cited, but to one 
published two years after the article in question!
11 Apparently, after 
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being criticized in a different law review years after he published the 
article we discussed, he provided additional information in another ar-
ticle with that journal.
12 We applaud him for taking these steps, and we 
can only marvel at his masterful use of persuasive tactics, but it 
doesn’t change the fact: anyone reading only Revesz’s original article 
(or Revesz’s article and everything cited in the article) would not have 
a clue as to how he conducted his research, on what basis he drew his 
conclusions, how to follow up on this research, or how to replicate his 
results. Our purpose in discussing Revesz’s article was not to make 
moral judgments about the character of someone we have never met, 
and readers should have no interest in whether Revesz has ever fol-
lowed this particular rule in other instances. We only sought to offer 
one prominent and clear example of an article that did not follow this 
particular rule of inference, so readers would be able to understand 
the rule and be able to follow it in the future. It now should be obvi-
ous that we accomplished that task, and Revesz’s response was irrele-
vant. 
We need to understand when it is appropriate to use the various 
tools that lawyers need and when use of those tools holds back pro-
gress. It would be an impossibly idealistic position to think that decep-
tion will never occur, but it is worth saying that we should all try to 
take the high road whenever possible. Revesz could easily have said: 
“(a) I agree with the rule that research ought to be replicable, (b) my 
article was not replicable when originally published and so the use of 
that example is appropriate, but (c) the information necessary to rep-
licate my piece is now on the public record.” This approach would 
have enabled him to defend his reputation, if he thought that neces-
sary, without misleading readers. Taking the high road in this way not 
only would have been better for everyone else, but it probably would 
also have been better for Revesz’s reputation. 
What Revesz misses here is that the stakes for the academic 
community and society at large in learning about the world are a lot 
higher than anyone’s personal reputation. This “game” we are playing 
is not about any of us—in other words, professors who work in cushy 
jobs, on beautiful campuses, heavily subsidized by the rest of society. 
When everything works, we are returning the favor to society and ful-
filling our obligation by contributing to a common good. Although 
personalities make up the contributors and come with every manner 
of human frailty, personal comments, attacks, and defenses are beside 
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the point. Similarly, what Goldsmith and Vermeule miss is that the 
stakes are also a lot higher than worrying about group-centered con-
cepts like “disciplinary hegemony.” In fact, neither political science 
nor any other discipline has an exclusive claim on the methods of sci-
ence used in learning about the world. The theory of inference under-
lying the rules adapted for particular applications is explicitly nondis-
ciplinary and applies to all those engaged in making empirical claims. 
As another example of how legal scholars confuse the goals of 
their enterprise, Professors Cross, Heise, and Sisk conclude their criti-
cisms with this remarkable sentence: “Notwithstanding the shortcom-
ings of The Rules of Inference, Lee Epstein and Gary King remain 
outstanding scholars.”
13 We appreciate the generosity, but if there was 
ever a non sequitur, this is it. Our Article was about the rules of infer-
ence, not Epstein and King, nor about Cross, Heise, and Sisk, nor 
about any individuals for that matter. Our reviewers would have 
accomplished more if they had kept their focus on the subject matter 
rather than the authors or themselves.
14 
Traditional academic fields in which empirical research follows 
the rules of inference and scholarly exchange contain much advocacy 
among scholars and their ideas. But the fight is for the truth or pro-
gress towards achieving consensus about the truth, and not about 
people. If the legal profession is interested in incorporating advocacy 
and persuasion into the traditions and norms of scientific discourse, 
precedents exist for doing this while also cooperating and increasing 
what we learn about the world. For example, Mellers, Hertwig, and 
Kahneman have demonstrated a model of “adversarial collaboration” 
in psychology whereby competing parties to an academic debate agree 
in advance on the set of empirical analyses necessary for resolving the 
dispute, with the help of an arbiter, and then the arbiter and both par-
ties collaborate on a joint publication to report the results.
15  
II.   SOME SPECIFICS 
We now turn to a few other specific points raised by our discuss-
ants. In each case, we discuss the flawed inference or logic as well as 
the persuasive tactic employed. 
                                                                                                                           
13  Cross, Heise, and Sisk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 150 (cited in note 2). 
14  This point is addressed explicitly in our Article. See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 
42 (cited in note 4). 
15  Barbara Mellers, Ralph Hertwig, and Daniel Kahneman, Do Frequency Representations 
Eliminate Conjunction Effects?: An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration, 12 Psych Sci 269, 269–
75 (2001). 2002]  A Reply 199 
A.  The Research Design for Our Empirical Study  
In order to justify the inclusion of a methods piece about the 
rules of inference in a law review, we felt it necessary to verify that 
there was indeed a problem to be solved. Reading and evaluating all 
articles in the nation’s 474 law reviews now published each year (ac-
cording to Lexis) was obviously out of the question. If our goal was to 
characterize the average article, we might have randomly selected arti-
cles to read. If our goal was to characterize the best articles, we would 
have defined “best” and chosen articles that fit that criterion. But our 
goal, instead, was to see if there existed a sufficiently large group of 
articles with methodological errors that would justify us writing an ar-
ticle solely about methodology and having a law review publish it. We 
felt we needed some justification since the publication of our piece 
would be unusual for a law review: although there is certainly much 
self-conscious attention to methodology in the context of substantive 
law review articles (and our paper should not be read as suggesting 
otherwise), we have seen no law review article (including those cited 
by our reviewers) that is devoted primarily to methodology, at least of 
the kind that appear in the methods subfields of most other academic 
disciplines. 
Thus, we wished to see whether we could identify a large group of 
articles with at least some methodological errors that might have been 
helped by a discussion of the rules of inference. We therefore selected, 
read, and evaluated the 231 law review articles with the word “empiri-
cal” in their title, supplemented by all articles that had some empirical 
subject matter in law reviews recognized as among the most prestig-
ious.
16 We found errors in every article. Thus, even if no other law re-
view articles had methodological errors, we felt this result—which re-
quired no inference—provided enough justification to write and pub-
lish our piece. That is, inference is about using facts you have to learn 
about facts you do not have, but for these three-hundred-plus articles, 
we had the facts. Since this result is purely descriptive and requires no 
inference, it is not subject to the complaints of the reviewers in clev-
erly but incorrectly applying the rules of inference to our empirical 
study. 
Of course, one need not go too far out on a limb to say also that if 
we found methodological errors in 100 percent of the more than three 
hundred articles we read, a good number of other articles would 
probably have methodological errors too (an inference we discussed 
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in footnote 41, which our reviewers did not cite). We believe this claim 
to be correct; our reviewers apparently believe it too, and our evi-
dence is consistent with it, but our conclusion about the merits of writ-
ing, publishing, and perhaps reading a methods paper in a law review 
does not depend on it. 
The Responses attributed goals we did not have or need to our 
qualitative survey of empirical legal literature. For example, Revesz 
argues: 
It may well be the case that empirical legal scholarship is in bad 
shape. But how do we know that social scientists do not engage in 
the same, or other, pitfalls when they write about law-related sub-
jects? . . . Any well-designed empirical study would have to make 
an assessment of practices among social scientists. Indeed, many 
of the methodological ills that they attribute to legal scholarship, 
such as explaining in detail how cases are coded or archiving data 
in generally accessible repositories, are not exclusive to legal 
scholarship.
17 
Revesz is absolutely correct: if you want to know whether law 
professors are better or worse at empirical analysis than social scien-
tists, you’d need to do a comparative study. But his discussion has little 
to do with our Article. We were clear: “[W]e do not mean to suggest 
that empirical research appearing in law reviews is always, or even 
usually, worse than articles in the journals of other scholarly disci-
plines. Such comparisons are irrelevant.”
18 Indeed, we still see no pro-
ductive purpose in such invidious comparisons: political scientists, 
economists, sociologists, and others make plenty of methodological er-
rors. We have no idea or interest in whether one group does better “on 
average” (whatever that means in this context). We think versions of 
the suggestions offered in our concluding section, for example, should 
also be considered for adoption in the traditional academic fields, al-
though the discussions there have been underway for some time. 
Revesz’s clever use of rhetoric here, by answering a question we did 
not ask, is irrelevant to the issue at hand and misleads readers. 
Revesz also uses the same rhetorical tactic when he writes: 
[G]iven the extent to which joint degree holders and otherwise 
academically trained individuals have moved into law teaching, it 
would be surprising if the quality of legal research—particularly 
empirical research—had not improved dramatically over time. . . . 
Surprisingly, after engaging in what they take to be an exhaustive 
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review of the literature, Epstein and King conclude that the re-
sults are grim.
19 
Indeed, it does sound like what we concluded is surprising, and 
hence (Revesz implies) probably wrong—until you read more care-
fully. First, our Article never claims to contain an “exhaustive” review 
of the literature or anything remotely approaching it. But more impor-
tantly, and more to the point, our little empirical study was not de-
signed to address the question of whether research in the law is get-
ting better or changing at all over time, and we drew no conclusions 
about such time trends. 
B.  Coding Decisions on Articles We Evaluated 
Professors Cross, Heise, and Sisk say they would have preferred if 
we had assigned numerical codes to every article we read, summariz-
ing the errors committed.
20 This is a fine goal, and we tried to do this, 
but we found that any coding scheme we could devise would not yield 
quantitative data that accurately represented the articles and their 
mistakes being coded. In our view, this is precisely when qualitative 
analysis is appropriate—which we support, analyze, and, in this case, 
conduct in our Article. Unlike Goldsmith and Vermeule’s misleading 
caricature of us as wanting “to remake all other disciplines in the im-
age of large-number statistical empiricism,”
21 we believe that the rules 
of inference apply equally to quantitative and qualitative research. We 
believe that the rules of inference apply equally to researchers whose 
main purpose is explicitly empirical and to researchers who use em-
pirical claims in the service of pushing “interpretive and normative 
program[s]”;
22 to studies that are quantitative and studies that are 
qualitative. So, for example, we do not advocate, in contrast to Gold-
smith and Vermeule’s deceptive claim, any simple method of counting 
statements in order to ascertain the intent of the Framers or legisla-
tors. As we emphasized, many concepts are not easily amenable to 
quantitative measurement, nor would measurement error necessarily 
be reduced if quantification were undertaken. Rather, we simply ask 
researchers to report to readers the information on which they based 
their conclusions, whether the information is quantified or not. We 
said this many times in our Article, and even in our Abstract. Whether 
one should use any particular method of collecting qualitative or 
quantitative data depends on how best to collect, amass, aggregate, 
understand, and extract information from the world in any particular 
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situation. The rules of inference are not statistical rules and, although 
we find statistical language convenient to describe them, other lan-
guages could be adopted and would result in identical conclusions. 
Explaining, as we did, that every article we read contained at least one 
violation of the rules of inference we described was, for stated pur-
poses, a sufficient description of our observations. 
Of the over three hundred individual articles we evaluated for 
our empirical study, only one of our critiques was questioned by the 
discussants—Revesz’s article. In his Response, Revesz explains that 
his article pointed out how selection bias affected prior studies and 
what he did about it.
23 Revesz may be correct about the consequences 
of selection bias in previous research but, as we now show, his meth-
odological procedures did not solve the problem and likely made it 
worse.  
Previous studies had included cases decided by different combi-
nations of judges in the same analysis. The bias from this procedure 
comes from the fact that the probability of success, which varies with 
the judges who make up the court, is likely correlated with the ex-
pected outcome of the case—the definition of selection bias.
24 Revesz’s 
idea to eliminate this correlation was to divide the cases up into thirty-
nine “court periods,” such that the probability of success did not vary 
within each, and so it could not co-vary with the outcome of the case.
25 
But the court periods were neither mutually exclusive nor exhaus-
tively sampled. Both problems can generate additional selection bias.  
That the periods were not mutually exclusive means that Revesz 
constructed the thirty-nine periods so that they overlapped, and also 
that the judges who decided each case varied within each of the peri-
ods. As a result, the strategic considerations and panel composition ef-
fects that caused the probability of success to vary (and co-vary with 
the likely outcome), and for which Revesz was trying to control, were 
not controlled and were indeed probably exacerbated. In addition, 
only ten of the thirty-nine periods actually made it into Revesz’s 
analyses, and they were not selected from the set of thirty-nine in a 
manner designed to mitigate selection bias.
26 The fact that including 
only ten of thirty-nine periods is in itself actually a selection decision, 
and so may result in selection bias if not done correctly, was not ad-
dressed, and the additional uncertainty that creates was ignored. Dis-
carding so much information also introduced additional inefficiencies 
into Revesz’s analysis, which of course can be worse than the bias he 
was seeking to eliminate. Additionally, the overlapping periods mean 
                                                                                                                           
23  Revesz, 69 U Chi L Rev at 173–75 (cited in note 10). 
24  Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 112–14 (cited in note 4). 
25  Revesz, 83 Va L Rev at 1721–27 (cited in note 11). 
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that, even if there was no selection bias, Revesz overestimated his 
level of certainty, since the ten periods were not independent, but 
were treated as independent. The article includes other violations of 
the rules of inference, in part resulting from Revesz’s failure to correct 
for selection bias, and in part due to his exclusive focus on bias with-
out noticing other effects his procedures had on efficiency (which also 
results from separately analyzing parts of his data set that would not 
be independent even if he had constructed each of the court periods 
correctly). In any event, our only claim was that each article we read 
violated one or more rules of inference; in the case of Professor 
Revesz’s article, our coding decision appears accurate.
27 
C.  Choosing Examples for Methods Articles 
What is the best way to choose an example to illustrate a 
method? Cross, Heise, and Sisk seem to think that random selection 
would be optimal and they have found the smoking gun in our hands: 
“Thus, they effectively admit that the examples adduced in their arti-
cle were not selected in any fashion even remotely approaching ran-
dom.”
28 Yes, we admit it; indeed, as teachers, we are proud of it. Ran-
domness can be a useful selection method when the goal is inference 
about features of a population, but it is useless when the goal is peda-
gogy, as was ours. How much would be learned about the key issues in 
constitutional law in a class where the cases discussed were selected at 
random from all Supreme Court cases? 
                                                                                                                           
27  Our coding decision also appears accurate with respect to Revesz’s choice of preference 
measures. He implies that we are not aware that the District of Columbia lacks representation in 
the Senate and hence senatorial privilege. See Revesz, 69 U Chi L Rev at 181 (cited in note 10). 
In fact, the Giles approach to preference measurement we discussed would have reduced the 
measurement error in Revesz’s indicator, even in D.C. See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 
95–96 (cited in note 1). This measure, as we discuss in the text, is based on NOMINATE scores of 
the President and home state senators, not on political party. Id at 95. In the case of D.C., the 
senator’s score obviously drops out, leaving only the appointing president’s NOMINATE 
score—still a measure with considerably less error than Revesz’s dichotomous party-based ap-
proach. And, in response to Cross, Heise, and Sisk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 136–37 n 9 (cited in note 
2), we note that NOMINATE scores, developed in 1982, were publicly available and widely used 
for at least a decade prior to the publication of Revesz’s and Cross’s articles. See Keith T. Poole, 
NOMINATE: A Short Intellectual History, 9 Polit Methodologist 2 (1999). The forthcoming Giles 
piece we cited was only one of many articles to use these scores, but even if it was the first and 
was unavailable, the Sisk, Heise, and Morriss position that readers should accept their empirical 
conclusions because they tried hard, does not follow. Readers have no professional interest in 
judging the authors’ work habits, only in the likelihood that the article’s conclusions are correct. 
At best, Sisk, Heise, and Morriss should have used a measure with less error. If that were not 
possible, they should have recognized the consequence of the error in their measurement and 
reported the likely size and direction of the bias in their results. At worst, if none of this seemed 
possible, they should have decreased the level of certainty they attached to their conclusions. 
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As we explained, we chose examples from articles that were as 
good as we could find, with the possible exception being the single 
methodological problem we were trying to illustrate. An optimal ex-
ample for describing the problem of omitted variable bias is one that 
has no problems of selection bias, inefficiency, measurement error, 
replication issues, etc.
29 These other issues are obviously important, but 
trying to explain every problem all at once is hardly an effective 
teaching tool. This is why carefully selecting an example so that it illus-
trates only the one methodological principle at issue, gives a clear vio-
lation of that principle, and makes it easy to suggest a way to fix the 
problem, is a standard and time-honored approach to methodological 
exposition. 
By presenting single errors in examples in this way, our goal was 
not to “indict,”
30 “attack,”
31 “brand,”
32 “criticize,”
33 or “trash”
34 anyone’s 
article or person. We recognize that such defensive reactions are the 
normal consequence of scholarly exchanges in this field and others, 
but we had a different purpose. We took few positions on whether the 
substantive conclusions about the legal world would be upheld based 
on our suggested changes. Our goal was to explicate the rules of infer-
ence we adapted for the law, and it seems we were successful since in 
most cases the discussants did seem to understand the rules as we ex-
plicated them—at least enough to agree with them. 
D.  Justifying Flawed Statistical Advice with Authoritative- 
Sounding Language 
We point out in a footnote in our Article that Sisk, Heise, and 
Morriss make incorrect statistical decisions in their article due to their 
misunderstanding of the concept of multicollinearity.
35 These authors 
excluded any explanatory variable from their regression analyses if it 
                                                                                                                           
29  See Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 15 (cited in note 1): 
Indeed, the optimal article for our purposes here is not one that violates each and every 
rule of inference. That would produce a mess, require long qualifications, and be almost use-
less from an expository perspective. The best example from our perspective is an article that 
is perfect in nearly every respect save one—the one that illustrates the rule we are explicat-
ing. That way we can demonstrate most cleanly and clearly the advantages of following a 
particular rule of inference. 
30  Goldsmith and Vermeule, 69 U Chi L Rev at 153 (cited in note 3); Revesz, 69 U Chi L 
Rev at 182 (cited in note 10). 
31  Cross, Heise, and Sisk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 135 (cited in note 2); Revesz, 69 U Chi L Rev 
at 169 (cited in note 10). 
32  Cross, Heise, and Sisk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 137 (cited in note 2). 
33   Id. 
34  Id at 147. 
35   Epstein and King, 69 U Chi L Rev at 11 n 28 (cited in note 1), discussing Gregory C. 
Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Statistical Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Statistical Reasoning, 73 NYU L Rev 1377 (1998). 2002]  A Reply 205 
correlated at 0.5 or higher with another explanatory variable, and we 
explained that their understanding of multicollinearity was “incorrect” 
and their statistical analysis strategy was “flawed.”
36 
In their response, Cross, Heise, and Sisk write that we “assert er-
ror and provide no evidence for [our] claim.”
37 This is indeed the case. 
We did not explain the details of the error the authors made since we 
did not think it was necessary to teach introductory statistics in this 
forum, especially since it is so easy to find the correct advice in a wide 
variety of modern statistical textbooks. Classic errors like this one 
constitute good examples of the kinds of errors that would likely be 
caught during peer review, although they obviously should not have 
been introduced in the first place. In any event, we do not object to 
this criticism: we could have explained their error in our Article and 
we will do so here. 
However, Cross, Heise, and Sisk go further than asking us to ex-
plain. Apparently without reflecting on our criticism, or consulting any 
of the numerous sources that could have set them straight, they stri-
dently claim that they were correct, and (quite recklessly) imply that 
other empirical researchers should follow their lead. They write, “We 
remain confident that our caution in applying the most stringent stan-
dard to this common problem remains the better part of scholarly dis-
cretion.”
38 The persuasive strategy of using language that is far more 
authoritative, strident, and certain than is accurate to claim is common 
and sounds impressive, but of course it has nothing to do with whether 
the advice is correct. In this case, Cross, Heise, and Sisk’s advice is not 
correct, and it cannot turn bad statistical advice into anything ap-
proaching “scholarly discretion.” 
What is multicollinearity? Multicollinearity is when one explana-
tory variable in a regression analysis can be perfectly predicted from 
the other explanatory variables—not approximately predicted, not a 
0.5 bivariate correlation, but predicted without error. If the prediction 
is not perfect, no multicollinearity problem exists. For example, if the 
other assumptions of the regression model apply, high (but not per-
fect) correlations among explanatory variables cause no statistical 
problems whatsoever. Indeed, multicollinearity is the one assumption 
of regression analysis that can be tested for certain by just running the 
regression. If the regression program completes, no multicollinearity 
problem exists; if the program complains about multicollinearity (us-
ing the equivalent language: multicollinearity, collinearity, incomplete 
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37   See Cross, Heise, and Sisk, 69 U Chi L Rev at 136–37 n 9 (cited in note 2).  
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rank of the explanatory variable matrix, matrix singularity, noninvert-
able Hessian, etc.), a problem exists. 
The reason we require the absence of multicollinearity in regres-
sion analysis is that the regression analysis algorithm—known as least 
squares—yields no unique solution when one or more of the explana-
tory variables can be perfectly predicted from the others. This makes a 
lot of intuitive sense. Suppose we wished to explain income with ex-
planatory variables that include sex and participation in an employee 
training program, but in our data all participants in the program are 
men and all nonparticipants are women. In this situation, the marginal 
effect of participation, controlling for sex, is obviously not defined—
since in these data the question is equivalent to asking for the effect of 
participation controlling for participation. If you care about the effect 
of participation on income controlling for sex, you must turn else-
where, since no information exists in these data. 
What is the consequence of high but not perfect collinearity? The 
answer is that inferences are not biased at all. The standard errors are 
larger than they would be if there were lower correlations among the 
explanatory variables, but the standard errors indeed should be larger 
and so they are also correct. To see this, imagine that we were able to 
add to our sample one female participant and one male nonpartici-
pant. With these two additional observations, the correlation between 
participation and sex is no longer perfect, but it is very high. Now 
when we try to estimate the effect of participation in the training pro-
gram on income, controlling for sex, we get unbiased estimates. How-
ever, the original set of observations includes very little information 
and so we can see that multicollinearity is essentially a problem of 
having a small number of (relevant) observations. This connection is 
true mathematically, not merely as an analogy. Indeed, Arthur Gold-
berger asks why, if multicollinearity and a small  sample size are 
equivalent problems, some analyses (incorrectly) focus so much on the 
former and not on the latter.
39 His tongue-in-cheek answer is that we 
have a big impressive word to describe the former but none for the 
latter, and so he suggests that we think about introducing tests for 
“micronumerosity.”
40 Indeed, if one’s data includes no observations, no 
inferences can be drawn; a small sample size is not usually a desirable 
situation, but valid inferences can be drawn from such a sample and, 
without collecting more data, no problems require correction. The 
same goes for multicollinearity. 
What is the consequence, then, of Cross, Heise, and Morriss’s de-
cision to exclude explanatory variables that correlate at 0.5 or higher 
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with each other, and Cross, Heise, and Sisk’s defense of this practice? 
The consequence is almost surely quite serious. As we explain in Part 
VI of our Article, researchers should control for an omitted variable if 
it affects the outcome variable, is causally prior to the key causal vari-
able, and is correlated with that key causal variable. If Cross, Heise, 
and Morriss’s analysis had followed all the other rules of inference, 
their explanatory variables would be identified because they met 
these conditions. Their decision to exclude variables that were highly 
correlated with each other thus guarantees omitted variable bias in 
their analysis. In fact, the higher the correlation of the explanatory 
variables with the one they are excluding (in their terms, the more 
“stringent” the standard they apply), the worse the bias their decision 
induces. Suffice it to say that this practice is undesirable and should be 
discouraged. 
E.  Timely Research Can Be Scientific without Tradeoffs 
Goldsmith and Vermeule write that “[i]f empirical research were 
costless, [Epstein and King’s] prescriptions would be sensible. But 
given constraints on time, information, expertise, and research funds, 
academics face inevitable tradeoffs between rigor and accuracy, on the 
one hand, and timeliness, relevance and utility on the other.”
41 The im-
plication, they say, is that “[a] universal insistence on Epstein and 
King’s version of methodological rigor might require making all stud-
ies less timely, thereby eliminating as well the studies that are both 
timely and accurate. Epstein and King have not shown that the costs 
of methodological perfectionism are worth incurring in the public-
policy realm.”
42 Indeed, they are correct that we have not shown this. 
But this is because we did not claim it and because perfectionism in 
methods at the expense of other goals is both inappropriate and un-
necessary.  
As we thought we had made clear in our Article, the fact is that 
doing serious scientific work well does not require perfection. The le-
gal profession values timeliness, but no more than biologists racing to 
be the first to locate a disease-causing gene, physicists trying to out-
distance each other in the search for new elementary particles, politi-
cal scientists forecasting and explaining election results or the behav-
ior of policymakers, or economists explaining a stock market crash. 
Maximizing one goal at the disproportionate expense of another is no 
more appropriate in methods than in any other area of life. 
Applying the rules of inference is not always easy in any particu-
lar project, and perfection is normally out of the question. So what do 
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we ask? We ask that the rules be understood, and that they be applied 
as intended (in other words, when they do not compromise other goals 
too much), and that uncorrected methodological problems be flagged 
for readers and an appropriate amount of additional uncertainty be 
added to one’s conclusions. This point is important enough that it is 
worth repeating: In any empirical research project, there always exist 
uncorrected methodological problems. The sign of good science is not 
that every problem be fixed in every project, since that is impossible 
and trying to do so would mean we would not accomplish much of 
anything, but rather that the problems be noted and the uncertainty in 
substantive conclusions be responsibly and honestly reported. 
If you are worried about bias in a causal effect that may result 
from an omitted control variable, and you have insufficient time or re-
sources to measure this variable, then you only need to make your 
best judgment as to the range of possible effects including this vari-
able would have had on your results. This range is precisely the addi-
tional uncertainty that should be conveyed to readers when expressing 
your conclusions. Research with fewer resources, more constraints, or 
more need for timeliness may turn out to be more uncertain, but hid-
ing this uncertainty and misleading readers is normally considered ir-
responsible. 
Far from requiring perfection and more time than is available, the 
rules of inference and methods of science make the best use of any 
level of available resources, given any deadline. Indeed, in the history 
of humankind, no method of learning about the world has proven it-
self to be faster, more productive, or more accurate. 
III.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Instead of continuing to detail other misleading statements made 
in the reviews, we conclude with three general points we hope the le-
gal community will take away from this Exchange. First, and most ob-
viously, serious empirical research cannot take place without attention 
to the rules of inference. We hope those who do or plan to do empiri-
cal research learn these rules and learn how to use them. As this one 
aspect of legal scholarship integrates into the rest of the academy, we 
hope scholars are able to take what is useful from the experience oth-
ers have had in this task, to adapt it for their own purposes, and even-
tually even to contribute new methods and knowledge of the world 
back to scholars in other fields pursuing other research questions. 
Second, methodological imports alone cannot sustain empirical 
research for long in an academic discipline as diverse and distinctive 
as the law. Social and natural scientists have their own research to 2002]  A Reply 209 
work on and their own methodological problems to solve.
43 Some from 
other areas will make their contributions to this field (and we hope 
our Article is taken in that light), but social scientists are mostly busy 
doing social science. What other academic disciplines have—but the 
community of legal scholars lacks—is not a set of specific facts or 
techniques. It is a well-developed methodological subfield devoted to 
solving new methodological problems as they arise. We see nothing in 
legal scholarship comparable to political methodology, econometrics, 
psychometrics, or sociological methodology. These subfields include 
methods appropriate to the data and inferential problems that arise in 
their fields (including the methods of statistics, interviewing, ethno-
graphies, modeling, participant observation, experiments, network 
analysis, archival work, historical studies, and many other diverse ap-
proaches). But these scholars do not have all the methods the legal 
community needs, and most do not have an interest in developing 
them for law professors. We think it should be obvious that legal 
scholarship is sufficiently important and distinct that it too needs its 
own methodology subfield devoted to solving its own problems. 
We close with a plea. When pursuing the goal of learning about 
the world through empirical research, take the high road: contribute, 
don’t deceive; be an advocate for the community of scholars, not for 
yourself. You’ll learn more; you’ll do it faster, better, and less expen-
sively. You’ll have more effect on public policy and jurisprudence. And 
you’ll teach more to the rest of us in academia and society at large. 
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